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Deontic power and institutional contexts: the impact of institutional design on deliberation and 
decision-making in the UK fracking debate 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this article I study the constraints and opportunities available to decision-makers in an institutional 
context (a county council), by analyzing the deliberative process that led to the rejection of an 
application for exploratory fracking.  Drawing on a corpus of 130,000 words, I intend to develop the 
theorization of argumentation in institutional contexts initiated in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 
2010) by drawing on philosopher John Searle’s (2010) concept of “deontic power”. Illustrating both the 
restrictive and enabling force of the institutional context, my analysis shows that, while decisions which 
are in keeping with institutional rules are legitimate in the sense of being legal, the reasonableness of 
the institutional context itself cannot be taken for granted. With various institutional rules in place 
seeming to obstruct rather than facilitate a rational decision outcome, and a local decision, 
democratically arrived at, subsequently legally overturned by central government, it can be argued 
that bias against local democracy was in this case built into (legal) institutional design.  
 
Keywords: argumentative pattern; argument scheme; decision-making; deliberation; deontic powers; 
fracking; institutional context; institutional design; risks and impacts; shale gas 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
This article aims to make two original contributions: (1) theoretically, to the study of argumentation in 
institutional contexts; (2) empirically, to the study of the public debate on shale gas exploration in the 
UK from an argumentative perspective. I will take for granted the ‘deliberation scheme’ I put forward 
in previous publications (Fairclough 2016, 2018a, 2018b), and will briefly repeat the gist of that 
theoretical proposal in section 3. I will also suggest how my research can connect with current advances 
in pragma-dialectics, particularly with the study of “(prototypical) argumentative patterns” in 
communicative activity types (van Eemeren 2016, 2017). By “argumentative pattern” I understand “a 
particular constellation of argumentative moves in which, in dealing with a particular kind of difference 
of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint, a particular argument scheme or combination 
of argument schemes is used in a particular kind of argumentation structure” (van Eemeren 2017a: 
159, italics in the original). 
 
The paper examines a corpus of 130,000 words – a transcript of 4 days of debate (23, 24, 25, 29 June 
2015) in the Lancashire County Council (henceforth, LCC), on the applications for exploratory fracking 
submitted by  oil-and-gas drilling company Cuadrilla in May 2014.  Cuadrilla applied for drilling at two 
locations, Roseacre and Preston New Road (henceforth, PNR), near Blackpool, in the Fylde area of 
North-West England. The Roseacre application was rejected unanimously by the councillors, in 
accordance with the recommendation of the council’s officer, on account of unacceptable traffic 
                                                   
1 I am grateful to Frans van Eemeren, David Miller, Norman Fairclough, the editors of this issue (Marcin 
Lewiński  and Mehmet Ali Uzelgun) and an anonymous reviewer for very useful comments on various drafts of 
this paper.  
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impacts (i.e., roads were said to be too narrow to safely support truck movement). The PNR  application 
(on which I mainly focus here) was also rejected (9 votes against, 3 in favour, 2 abstentions), against 
the officer’s recommendation,  on grounds of unacceptable noise and visual impacts, and the 
unacceptable prospect of industrialization of a rural area. Since then, following Cuadrilla’s appeal and 
a public inquiry, the PNR decision was overturned by the government (October 2016), and exploratory 
drilling started in Lancashire in August 2017, with the first horizontal well completed in April 2018 (Drill 
Or Drop n.d.). The 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week rolling protest that began outside the  PNR site in 
January 2017  had resulted in 341 arrests up to March 2018 (Hayhurst 2018).   
 
On 23 and 25 June 2015, members of the public were allowed to speak in favour or against the two 
applications, in the open session of the council. All speeches were limited to 4 minutes, were video-
recorded and were made available for a limited number of weeks on the LCC website, from where they 
were transcribed for the purpose of this study2. (All quotations in this paper are from this corpus, with 
the exception of a few passages from the LCC Constitution and a few summaries, clearly marked as 
such.) Both days began with the Council’s officer reading his report and stating the case for approving 
the PNR application, and for rejecting the Roseacre application. In each case, his presentation was 
followed by a few dozen speeches by members of the public, arguing either in favour or against the 
proposal to allow Cuadrilla to proceed with drilling for shale gas. Overall, my corpus contains 71  
speeches against and  38  speeches in favour of the applications, made by members of the public, as 
well as several dozen speeches made by councillors, experts and council officers, and the officer’s 
reports, which were read aloud.  The purpose of virtually  all these speeches was to either support or 
reject the proposal to allow Cuadrilla to start exploring for shale gas in the area, by arguing for example 
that all risks and impacts were being acceptably mitigated, or that, on the contrary, the risks and 
impacts were unacceptable. The corpus is thus virtually entirely argumentative and deliberative, 
including most of the passages in which procedural and legal matters are discussed3. Describing the 
constraints placed upon the decision-making process by the institutional set-up, and being thus part of 
the institutional ‘context’, such passages are not merely background, but furnish decision-makers with 
‘deontic reasons’ or premises (e.g. obligations or prohibitions), which need to be factored into the final 
decision. Similarly, the officer’s two ‘reports’, containing detailed descriptions of the applicant’s 
proposals (drilling depth, overall surface, decibel levels, rig height, etc.) and including the 
characteristics of each site and the proposed mitigation measures, also feed into the conclusion that 
the applications should (or should not) be approved. Their function is also argumentative: at the end 
of a balance-of-considerations line of reasoning in each case (analyzed in Fairclough 2018b), the LCC 
officer concluded that, in his view, based on all the evidence, there were no compelling reasons to 
reject the PNR application, but there were such reasons to reject the Roseacre application. 
 
My focus will be on the deliberation and decision-making process, on the way in which the proposal 
for shale exploration was defended and criticized by the parties to the debate, and the role played by 
institutional design in the decision-making process. By institutional design I understand a particular 
way in which a set of rules are configured in the creation of an institution, in  order to give agents 
powers to act, and thus fulfil the purposes of that institution. Following Searle (2005, 2010), I see an 
institution as a system of constitutive rules (procedures, practices, norms), giving people the power to 
do certain things, in virtue of their collectively recognized institutional status, as well as restricting their 
freedom to act. Institutions are always created by speech acts of declaration. In this case it is mainly 
                                                   
2 The corpus was transcribed from the video recordings (webcasts) by  Phillip Norris, research intern at UCLAN.  
 
3 The only exceptions are those passages in which ‘primary’ procedural constraints are described, e.g. that no 
speaker shall speak for more than 4 minutes.  
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the LCC’s Constitution, as speech act of declaration (and the various more specific sets of rules and 
codes or practice operating at the level of each council committee) that gives councillors their power 
to decide on the applications, but also restricts their freedom to take various considerations into 
account. For example, as I will show, the rules of the LCC’s Development Control Committee4 include 
a set of ‘material considerations’ that decision-makers must take into account, but also prevents them 
from deciding on the basis of reasons which fall outside this set. For example, ‘human rights’ and 
‘climate change’ concerns, as well as effects on local house prices are not ‘material considerations’ for 
oil-and-gas applications, and cannot be used to decide against them. In a public debate, people may of 
course argue from such reasons, but the final decision cannot be based on them. I will also refer to the 
broader institutional context (the relation between local and national institutions) that, in this case, 
allowed a legitimate, local democratic decision  to be subsequently legally overturned by a government 
minister on appeal.  
 
I will develop the theorization of argumentation in institutional contexts initiated in pragma-dialectics 
by drawing on Searle’s (2010) concept of “deontic power” and his theory of institutional reality. I first 
introduced Searle’s theory of the social world into the theorization of deliberative activity types in my 
2012 monograph (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). I argued there that Searle’s conception of how 
institutional reality comes into being and how it provides agents with reasons for action – in the form 
of rights, obligations, authorizations, entitlements, prohibitions – is essential to an understanding of 
how arguments are made and evaluated in institutional contexts (see also  Fairclough 2016; 2018a). 
The debate I will analyze here took place in a formal institutional context (a county council), which 
imposed a range of constraints on the argumentation that was allowed, but at the same time offered 
opportunities (I will call these “affordances”) for challenging and rejecting the proposal. I will show 
how the notion of “deontic reason” offers a principled way of distinguishing among the different types 
of pre-conditions that shape argumentation in context, and separating genuinely institutional pre-
conditions from non-institutional ones. Both act as constraints and affordances, both can restrict and 
enable action, but their nature is different. 
 
In the analysis, I will focus primarily on the way in which institutional constraints and affordances (in 
the form of which reasons may or may not count, what obligations must be satisfied, who has the right 
to decide) shaped the final decisions. Some of these affordances, available in principle, turned out to 
be missed opportunities in practice. For example, although it should have been possible, in principle, 
to reject the applications on account of unacceptable risks, this possibility was foreclosed before the 
debate, as all relevant agencies tasked with assessing the risks had declared them to be low. With shale 
gas exploration being yet untested in the UK, decision-makers seemed to have already accepted that 
view of the risks, in the absence of significant evidence to the contrary from the UK.  While the evidence 
coming from the United States showed fracking to be a highly controversial technology, with clear 
negative impacts, that evidence was not considered relevant by the expert organizations supporting 
the industry, in view of the allegedly “robust”, “gold-standard” regulatory regime in place in the UK. 
The strongest public objections against fracking, having to do with risks to the environment and public 
health, were thus neutralized, while a range of other objections could not be taken into account, being 
precluded by the institutional rules in place. In spite of this, partially as a consequence of taking legal 
advice, councillors opposed to shale exploration managed to exploit the narrow constraints and 
affordances of institutional context in the best way available to them. Unable to reject the application 
on account of unacceptable risks, left with a small range of unacceptable impacts as possible grounds 
for rejection, they used these as non-overridable, decisive critical objections, by availing themselves of 
                                                   
4 This is the committee that decided on these  particular applications. 
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their legal rights to assign different weights to the same evidence and to disagree with the 
recommendation of their officers.  
 
 
2. Institutional design as a source of deontic reasons 
Recent developments in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010; van Eemeren and Garssen 2010; 2012) 
have focused on the way in which institutional contexts create “pre-conditions” for argumentation and 
its evaluation. One way of summing up this line of research, I suggest, is by saying that argumentation 
may fail to comply with the ideal normative model of critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992; 2004), yet still be judged reasonable, if whatever deviations from the normative model may occur 
are the result of  institutional arrangements in place in the context. As I show in this paper, for a 
normative conclusion, leading to a decision, to be reasonable and capable of withstanding criticism, it 
must be assumed that the institutional context itself is reasonable and capable of withstanding 
criticism. A decision to adopt a proposal may be unreasonable because the proposal’s consequences 
have not been properly thought through. But even when they have been, the decision may still be 
unreasonable if the design of the decision-making procedure, in the institutional context, has not 
allowed decision-makers to give proper weight to these consequences in deliberating over the 
proposal, or take the concerns of those potentially affected into account. An institutional order that is 
defensible on the grounds of being legal may be criticizable from a viewpoint grounded in local 
representative democracy, if the rules in place prevent  the local population from participating in the 
decision-making process, on matters that affect them directly. This particular decision on shale gas is 
a case in point.  
 
While defending the context-independence of the ideal normative model of critical discussion, the 
research programme of pragma-dialectics emphasizes that actual argumentation always takes place in 
a real-life context, and this context is often institutional, sometimes in a very strong, formal sense (e.g., 
parliament, county council). In the last decade, an important direction of research has concerned the 
way in which the evaluation of argumentative practice has to take into account the constraints and 
possibilities created by the institutional context. I have argued elsewhere that, while it would not be 
reasonable to hold arguers responsible for argumentative moves which they are either forced to make 
or cannot make due to the constraints placed on them by the institutional context legitimately in place, 
the legitimacy of that context cannot be taken for granted5. An institutional set-up that is collectively 
recognized and accepted de facto may not be one that ought to be accepted, normatively speaking, 
i.e., one that would ultimately withstand critical questioning (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 28). 
 
In their research on deliberative activity types in the European Parliament, van Eemeren (2010: 
152n48) and, subsequently, van Eemeren and Garssen (2011: 48) distinguish between primary and 
secondary (institutional) pre-conditions for argumentation. Primary preconditions are said to be 
“official, usually formal and often procedural” (such as the Chair stopping participants from speaking 
more than their allocated time), while secondary preconditions are “as a rule unofficial, usually 
informal, and often substantial”. An example of the latter is the so-called “European predicament” in 
which MEPs may find themselves, seeing as they “need to combine serving the European interest with 
serving the interests of their home countries” (van Eemeren 2010: 152). In other words they often “are 
                                                   
5 See Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 109-112) for “legitimation” as a two-tier process of justification. Van 
Eemeren (2010) deals with this by talking about “higher-order” conditions. In actual practice, he shows, it 
depends on the satisfaction of higher-order conditions, having to do with the socio-political context (e.g., on 
whether participants are free to question a standpoint), whether it makes sense to give a verdict about the 
reasonableness of argumentative discourse and its participants. 
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not in the position to promote only the European cause, as they are officially expected to do”, but have 
to “also keep in mind the particular interests of the country that elected them and pursue their national 
cause as well”; they have, as it were, “unofficial national obligation[s]”, and are in a sense “forced to 
support their national interests”, in addition to the European interest (van Eemeren and Garssen 2011: 
47-48, all italics mine). I have italicized these words to draw attention to the fact that, although the 
connection with Searle’s theory of institutional reality is not made in pragma-dialectics, the view of 
“institutional preconditions” outlined above is evidently compatible with it. Searle’s view of the 
institutional world as a theory of “deontic power” is one where power flows through society by means 
of the reasons for action people have acquired as members of institutions, and these reasons  take the 
form of rights, obligations, authorizations, prohibitions – exactly the constraints said to be operating 
on MEPs in the pragma-dialectical account above. To say that MEPs have entitlements and obligations 
is to say that their ‘status function’ (Searle’s term) as MEPs confers them positive and negative ‘deontic  
powers’, which both enable and restrict their possibilities for action, by giving them reasons  (premises 
in practical arguments) to act in particular ways. For example, MEPs may conclude that they ought to 
defend the European interest because they have an obligation to do so (as reason),  in virtue of their 
institutional role. 
 
Van Eemeren (2010: 138-143) distinguishes among genres, activity types and concrete speech events. 
Along these lines, a particular county council debate (e.g., the debate that took place on 25 June 2015 
in the Lancashire County Council) can be said to instantiate the abstract category of county council 
debate as activity type (i.e., a specific genre format), which in turn instantiates the abstract genre of 
deliberation. The intended outcome of deliberative activity types is a normative-practical conclusion 
(judgment) that can ground decision and action. For any individual agent, this cognitive outcome can 
be followed by an intention to act, a decision to act and by the action itself, but does not have to be. 
Like parliamentary debates, county council debates require more than the minimal outcome of a 
normative-practical judgment. It is part of their institutional rationale that they should lead to a 
decision for action, yet this decision may not be in agreement with the normative judgment arrived at 
by each and every participant who has been involved in the debate. In other words, the outcome that 
can be reasonably expected is a collective decision (e.g., based on a majority of votes), not a unanimous 
normative judgment, and initial disagreements among all participants may remain unresolved 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 200-207, Fairclough, 2018a: 244).  
 
Searle (2010) gives a clear account of how language creates and maintains the elaborate structures of 
the social world. All institutions (county councils, marriage, promises) come into being by means of 
speech acts of declaration and are maintained in existence by collective recognition. Declarations 
assign status functions to individuals (and objects), e.g., the UK government  granting someone the 
status of UK citizen (and a corresponding passport). Status functions, e.g., being or becoming a UK 
citizen, carry (and confer) deontic powers: rights, obligations, duties, entitlements, authorizations, 
prohibitions. Deontic powers, collectively assigned and recognized, thus provide agents with “desire-
independent” reasons for action, i.e., reasons that are distinct from what agents would like to do, and 
thus effectively regulate power relations in society. For example, a job contract (as speech act of 
declaration) gives agents reasons (in the form of rights and obligations) to behave in ways that may be 
different from or even contrary to their inclinations and desires. The whole point of institutional reality, 
Searle shows, is to create and regulate power relationships between people (Searle 2010: 6-15, 
Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 72-73). 
 
On this account, all institutions enable and constrain human action, creating possibilities as well as 
restrictions on people’s behaviour as agents operating within their constitutive rule-governed 
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boundaries.6 In deliberating and deciding what to do, people have to weigh deontic reasons (e.g., 
obligations) against other motivations (e.g., desires). Desire-independent, “deontic” reasons cannot be 
easily overridden in deliberation. This does not mean they are not frequently overridden (and there 
may be bad but also good reasons for doing so), but it may be more reasonable to decide that your 
obligations ought to override your inclinations than vice-versa. For most people, it would be “wrong” 
to do otherwise, or at least prudentially ill-advised, seeing as deontic reasons, originating in 
institutional arrangements, are typically inscribed in norms and laws and backed by the coercive power 
of the state, of public opinion, etc. (Fairclough and Fairclough 2013). In this paper I argue that, while 
institutional contexts provide agents with overriding reasons for action that need to be factored into 
the decision-making process, the effect of these deontic reasons may sometimes be to decrease, rather 
than increase, the rationality of the decision-making process. This happens when the institutional 
framework itself (while collectively recognized, in this case legal) is poorly conceived or in other ways 
inappropriate (e.g., creating obligations or prohibitions that would not withstand critical questioning). 
 
In deciding on Cuadrilla’s applications, councillors were using the deontic powers assigned to them by 
Parliament and inscribed in the Council’s Constitution. By declaration, the LCC Constitution (2018) sets 
out (what from Searle’s perspective are) the councillors’ positive and negative deontic powers: what 
they are authorized, obliged and entitled to do, and what they cannot or must not do. Some of these 
deontic constraints are purely procedural (not a matter of substantive content). For example: 
 
At a Full Council meeting no Councillor shall speak more than once on each Motion or 
Amendment proposed… No speech may exceed 5 minutes…  Permission to continue speaking is 
in all cases subject to the consent of the Chair… Votes shall be by show of hands or by affirmation 
of the meeting. … [A]ny matter will be decided by a simple majority of Councillors …  entitled to 
vote and present in the room … The Chair of a meeting shall have, in case of equality of votes, a 
second or casting vote.  
 
Most, however, involve a mixture of procedural and substantive content. For example, regarding the 
“role of county councillors” (i.e., what this “status function” involves, what “deontic powers” it confers, 
e.g. what they are obliged and authorized to do), the Constitution says the following: 
 
County councillors are elected every four years and are democratically accountable to residents 
in their electoral division. Their overriding duty is to the whole community of Lancashire, but they 
have a special duty to their constituents, including those who did not vote for them. All County 
Councillors will: 
 
1. collectively through the Full Council approve the Constitution, the Budget, Council Tax levels 
and Policy Frameworks and carry out a number of strategic and corporate management 
functions; 
2. be involved in decision-making by participating in Council Committees … ; 
3. represent their communities and bring their views into the Council’s decision-making process, 
i.e., become the advocate of and for their communities; 
4. deal with local issues and act as an advocate for constituents in resolving particular concerns 
or grievances; 
5. balance different interests identified within the electoral division and represent the electoral 
division as a whole… 
                                                   
6 Van Eemeren also notes the dual nature of institutional preconditions, as “constraints that involve certain 
restrictions, but also open up opportunities” (Eemeren 2010: 153). 
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Another role is essential to the functioning of a county council: the council officers, with distinct deontic 
powers. Unlike County Councillors, who are the “elected representatives of their community” and thus 
“directly accountable to the electorate for the delivery of policies and Services”, Council Officers are 
“politically neutral and not elected”, and are “required to carry out their duties objectively, free of any 
political bias”. They are “administrative, professional, technical and operational staff, who advise the 
council, cabinet and committees on all aspects of council functions” and implement their decisions. 
Both councillors and officers have an obligation of “impartiality”: 
 
Councillors must not favour any person, company, group or locality, nor put themselves in a 
position where they appear to do so… The basis of the planning system is the consideration of 
private proposals against wider public interests. Councillors must take decisions on behalf of the 
community as a whole. Much is often at stake in this process and opposing views are often 
strongly held by those involved. Whilst Councillors should, of course, take account of those views, 
they must remain impartial… 
 
The main rule governing decision-making in the institutional context of the LCC’s Development Control 
Committee (DCC), is the following: “decisions are to be taken in light of relevant “material” 
considerations and in accordance with the (local) development plan” – in this case, the planning 
policies of Lancashire County Council and Fylde Borough Council. The local development plan, 
however, may reasonably be overridden, for example by national guidance or national policies. In the 
Constitution, this rule is formulated as follows: 
 
Decisions should be taken in accordance with the Development Plan unless material 
considerations indicate otherwise. Departures [from the Development Plan] must be advertised 
as such and, if it is intended to approve the application, the material considerations must be 
identified and it must be stated why they override the plan policies…  
 
The Constitution also states that, while councillors must take their officers’ advice into consideration, 
they can decide in a way that is “contrary to Officer Recommendations and/or the Development  
Plan”, provided the reasons for doing so are “clear and convincing”, and also provided the County 
Council’s position “has been reached in open fashion” and can be defended, if needed, at a public 
inquiry. Councillors are allowed to decide against the local development plan, in order “to accord with 
the legislation and Government Guidance”. This indicates that national objectives are allowed to 
override local ones, if there are good reasons for doing so. 
 
In a way similar to the “European Predicament” identified by van Eemeren, councillors seem to be 
under multiple and potentially conflicting obligations. They have an obligation to advocate the interests 
of their own constituency, as elected representatives, but at the same time are required to be 
“impartial” and represent the electoral division as a whole, including the interests of people “who did 
not vote for them” and whose interests might in fact be diametrically opposed to the interests of those 
who did vote for them. They might also be expected to allow local development guidelines to be 
overridden by national guidelines, in a way that may be at odds with local democracy and their duty 
towards their electorate. The decision on Cuadrilla’s applications illustrated these conflicts of 
obligations most dramatically, as I will show below.   
 
3. Deliberation and decision-making: analytical framework and methodology 
I will draw (and expand on) the analytical framework I have developed in previous publications 
(Fairclough 2016, 2018a, 2018b; for earlier versions, see Fairclough 2015 and Fairclough & Fairclough 
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2012), consisting in a ‘deliberation scheme’ and a set of critical questions for the analysis of deliberative 
activity types.7 In my work so far, I have taken a critical rationalist perspective on practical reasoning 
and decision-making (Miller 1994; 2006; 2013), suggesting a view of deliberation as a critical procedure 
that filters out those conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the critical test of 
whether the intended or unintended consequences would be acceptable. Unacceptable consequences 
(e.g., unacceptable impacts or risks of a course of action) are decisive objections against a proposal and 
can conclusively rebut it. I take every objection that is non-overridable – e.g. respect for the dignity 
and autonomy of the individual – or has emerged as such, in a process of critical questioning aimed at 
achieving an ordering of the normative sources involved in a particular decision,  to be a decisive 
objection. The purpose of critical testing is (1) to eliminate unreasonable proposals by examining their 
potential consequences; (2) to enable non-arbitrary choice of a better proposal, if several reasonable 
proposals have withstood criticism.8  
 
I see deliberation as the critical testing of alternative proposals for action, designed to enable rational 
decision-making. As I first suggested in Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), two main argument schemes 
are involved in deliberative activity types, in my view: an argument from goals, circumstances (facts, 
“problems”) and means-goal relations, and an argument from negative (undesirable) consequences. In 
deliberation, one or more proposals are subject to critical questioning which seeks to expose potential 
negative consequences and thus evaluate them in terms of their acceptability: if the consequences are 
on balance unacceptable, then it would be more reasonable to reject the proposal. Critical testing of 
alternative proposals may be followed by choice of a “better” alternative among those proposals that 
have survived criticism (if any) and by a decision to adopt that alternative. The most significant 
perspective in light of which proposals are to be tested is therefore (in my view) a consequentialist one 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, Fairclough 2016). I use the term “consequence” in a broad sense, to 
refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the intended goals of the proposed action (the intended 
consequences); the potential unintended consequences (possible side effects or risks) involved; various 
known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to 
result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from 
both a consequentialist and deontological ethical position (i.e. it is unacceptable that the consequences 
of the proposal are unjust for those affected, and it is also unacceptable that the proposal goes against 
justice as moral-political value). This framework (the “deliberation scheme”, Figure 1) can therefore 
accommodate deontological ethics within a broader consequentialist perspective.  
 
Naturally, other argument schemes may be used in deliberative activity types. For example, proposals 
can also be supported or rejected by appeals to authority, by argumentation from analogy, or by 
arguments from positive consequence (this last scheme is in fact shown on the diagram). To put it 
differently, empirical research shows that a wide range of schemes are used in deliberative activities. 
However, the strong position I am restating here is that the minimal deliberative situation, as a 
normative construct, involves two schemes only, and a relation between them. It involves putting 
forward a proposal A (or more) as a conjecture (in light of goals and values, and in view of 
circumstances one is in), and then testing it in light of its potential negative consequences. The first 
question an agent is likely to ask is:  what action is likely to achieve my goals/ solve my problem? The 
                                                   
7 An adapted version of this framework is being used by other researchers in argumentation theory, e.g.  Lewiński 
and Mohammed (2019), Rodrigues et al (2019), in this issue. A new methodological perspective on the fracking 
controversy, combining argumentation and framing theory, is provided by Musi & Aakhus (2019), this issue. 
 
8 In Fairclough (2018b), I used the term “critical objection” to refer to non-overridable objections or rebuttals. 
Here, to avoid possible confusion,  seeing as all objections, weak or strong, are in a sense “critical”, I suggest 
using the term “decisive objections” to refer to those critical objections that can rebut a practical conclusion. 
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answer will take the form of one or more conjectures (hypotheses) that A (or various alternatives) will 
deliver the goals. The second question is: if were to do A, are any unacceptable consequences likely to 
occur, that would indicate that I should not do A?   I draw a clear distinction between 
negative/undesirable consequences, which do not necessarily indicate that a proposal is unreasonable, 
and unacceptable consequences, which do; undesirable consequences are counterconsiderations to a 
proposal that may go ahead, in spite of these, while unacceptable consequences  are decisive 
objections to it, indicating it should not go ahead (see Fairclough forthcoming). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a particular situation, in which a proposal, tentatively supported in light of 
desirable goals and other positive consequences, is conclusively rebutted in light of its unacceptable 
consequences. The only two argument schemes that, in my view, are necessary (and sufficient) for 
deliberation to occur are these two. In my view, therefore, the “argumentative pattern” (van 
Eemeren 2017) characterizing deliberative activity types must contain these two schemes, though 
(optionally)  it may also include other schemes as well. I also suggest that this proposal alone is 
compatible with a critical rationalist stance. Like theoretical statements, practical statements can be 
provisionally accepted or conclusively rejected based on how they withstand criticism in light of their 
consequences. If a proposal (the hypothesis that doing A will deliver the intended goal or solve a 
problem) withstands criticism (i.e. no decisive objections are found), then it may be tentatively 
accepted, but should be rejected otherwise (unless satisfactory mitigation, a Plan B or an insurance 
strategy are available, or unless the agent is willing to accept the risk, however unacceptable the 
consequences may be – see below).  
 
The particular configuration of the “deliberation scheme” in Figure 1 can thus be taken as one of the 
possible “argumentative patterns” characteristic of deliberative activity types (see Fairclough 2018b 
for  two more possible configurations of the same scheme.)9  The pattern shown in Figure 1 is one 
where Proposal A1 is rebutted in light of decisive critical objections that have come to light, through 
critical questioning, during the deliberative process. While it may be true that A1 can achieve the 
goals and other positive effects (the light grey area), it follows conclusively that A1 should be 
abandoned, seeing as there are unacceptable consequences (the dark grey area). It no longer follows, 
not even defeasibly or tentatively, that A1 is the right course of action. The blank box is supposed to 
suggest this: the conclusion in favour of A1, although possible in principle, is rebutted in this 
particular situation by the decisive objections, which conclusively support the opposite conclusion. 
The argumentative configuration that actually materializes whenever there are decisive objections is 
the deductive argument supporting non- A1 (the dark grey area on the left-hand side). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9I first related my “deliberation scheme” to van Eemeren’s concept of “argumentative patterns” in the paper 
“Institutional constraints as premises in conductive reasoning on shale gas exploration in the UK”, given at the 
Symposium on Argumentation in Institutional Contexts, held at the University of Central Lancashire (Preston), 
on 22 March 2017.  
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Fig. 1. Deliberation scheme: situation where proposal is rebutted in light of decisive objections  
 
 
Consequences typically take the form of impacts or risks. Impacts are different from risks. Impacts are 
known consequences: if agents want to achieve their goals, certain impacts will be unavoidable. By 
contrast, risks may or may not materialize. A visual impact on the landscape is an unavoidable impact 
if the goal is to exploit shale gas, but causing an earthquake by drilling is a risk that may not materialize. 
Proposals with potentially unacceptable consequences may be maintained if the undesirable 
consequences can be avoided, minimized, controlled, or in other ways made acceptable. One way of 
doing this would be via a “Plan B” (an alternative course of action which avoids those consequences); 
another would be “mitigating” the impacts or “controlling”/ “managing” the risks; yet another would 
be transferring them to another party, e.g., “insuring” against them. Risks and impacts can also be 
simply accepted, as an inevitable way of achieving the goals.  The set of critical questions (CQs) that 
can effectively test a practical proposal (Fairclough 2018a) includes therefore the following: Are the 
intended consequences (i.e. the goals and known impacts) of the proposal acceptable? Are the 
foreseeable unintended consequences (i.e. risks) of the proposal acceptable?  (And if  not, is there a 
Plan B, mitigation or insurance strategy in place that can make it reasonable to undertake the proposed 
action?) While these CQs challenge the reasonableness of the proposal itself, and can conclusively 
refute it, the inference to the conclusion in favour of the proposal can also be challenged, by asking 
whether, among reasonable alternatives that have withstood criticism in light of their consequences, 
a particular proposal is ‘better’, from whatever perspective is important in the context. 
 
The Lancashire debate on exploratory fracking illustrated all of these ways of dealing with known or 
potential consequences. The applicant and the LCC officer argued that the application successfully 
mitigated all relevant impacts, while the opponents denied that mitigation was remotely adequate. 
The applicant and their supporters argued that all risks were low and adequately controlled via the 
regulation and permitting process in place, while their opponents categorically denied this and called 
for the “precautionary principle” to be applied, in light of the magnitude of the risks and genuine future 
uncertainty. The proposal was also judged unacceptable because no acceptable insurance or 
compensation scheme was in place for those affected. At least one Plan B was also suggested, e.g., 
locate the fracking pads in another area, far from villages and farms, seeing as the proposed sites were 
unacceptably close (250 m) to the nearest houses. Finally, even assuming the consequences were 
adequately mitigated and insured against, i.e. even assuming the proposal could not be refuted in light 
of its impacts and risks, the opponents still argued that better alternatives were available (investing in 
renewable energy). 
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4. Argument schemes in the fracking debate 
In rejecting the PNR application on 29 June 2015, councillors voted against the recommendation of 
their own planning officer. The officer had recommended approving it, subject to about 40 conditions 
that the applicant would have to comply with. These conditions were said to “minimize” the impacts 
and risks raised as objections by the opponents, making these objections “unsustainable”. The 
application was also said to comply with all relevant national and local legislation, except for two local 
policies, which could allegedly be “overridden” in the context (seeing as “little weight should be 
attached to [them]… and more weight should be attached to the policies of minerals and waste”). (I 
have provided a  more detailed analysis of this recommendation, as a pro/con, balance-of-
considerations, “conductive” argument, in Fairclough 2018b. See also Lewinski 2016 for pro-con 
argumentation over shale gas.) 
 
The same argument in favour of allowing fracking to proceed was made by a few members of the public 
who took the floor during the June 2015 LCC debates. They argued that the proposal would achieve 
important goals and other positive consequences –  economic growth (job creation), energy security 
and lower carbon emissions (shale gas being said to be a clean, “bridging” fuel) – that would outweigh 
all undesirable impacts. Throughout the four days of deliberation, two main arguments in favour were 
heard: a general one, in favour of shale gas exploitation as a future source of energy and local economic 
reinvigoration, and a more specific one, in favour of the exploratory phase, involving the construction 
of just one fracking pad. These can be expressed as follows:  
 
[Summary] As a potential source of energy, shale gas is likely to achieve important goals and 
other positive consequences, nationally and locally. The risks and impacts are minimal, given 
the UK’s strict regulatory system, and can be acceptably mitigated and controlled. The 
proposals for shale gas exploration should therefore be approved. 
 
[Summary] A fracking pad will have some undesirable impacts (noise, visual), and may involve 
some risks. Seeing as all the risks are low and the impacts can be effectively minimized and 
controlled, seeing as the development is temporary, and in view of the national importance of 
shale gas exploration, the proposals (applications) should be approved. 
 
These two ways of arguing were not clearly kept apart in the speeches in favour. Without exception, 
all the speakers who supported the application emphasized the alleged local and national benefits of 
shale gas, on the assumption that the exploratory phase would lead to the commercial exploitation 
phase. The council officer, however, was careful to dissociate this argument from what he said was 
really at stake in the debate: a proposal for exploration only, by constructing one fracking pad in each 
of the two locations, in relation to which no economic benefit could yet be claimed. His argument in 
favour seemed to be based not on what the proposal would achieve (beyond finding out whether there 
are shale gas reserves in the area), but on how it withstood criticism: there were no “sustainable” 
reasons to refuse it, seeing as the risks and impacts were minimal (“minimized by condition” and 
“controlled” by the regulation system) and the development would be “temporary” (6 years 
maximum).  
 
The June 2015 debates saw a continuous redefinition of the confrontation by members of the public, 
councillors and officers, with the officer insisting on keeping exploration and potential commercial 
exploitation separate, and the public conflating the two, on the (arguably correct) assumption that 
they were inextricably linked and should be assessed together. The most prominent way of arguing 
against the proposals was by emphasizing that the negative consequences were unacceptable (though 
other arguments, e.g., that they would not achieve the stated goals, e.g. lower carbon emissions, were 
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also made). The argument against the exploratory applications was often merged with the argument 
against the prospect of full-scale exploitation (said to potentially involve dozens or hundreds of fracking 
pads), on the assumption that the exploration phase was in fact intended to “open the door to the 
massive industrialization” of the Fylde. Both arguments, against exploration and against shale gas 
exploitation in general, were based on the same range of unacceptable impacts and risks:   
 
[Summary] The proposals will have unacceptable impacts (noise, pollution, visual impacts, 
traffic impacts), thus going against a number of local policies, and will involve unacceptable 
risks (water contamination, earthquakes, damage to public health, damage to the local 
economy, particularly agriculture and tourism), violations of human rights and obligations 
regarding climate change. There will be no significant local benefits. No potential benefits at 
national level are worth these risks and impacts, which cannot be acceptably minimized or 
controlled, and whose potential magnitude is unacceptable. Therefore, the proposals should 
not go ahead (the applications should be rejected).10 
 
These ways of arguing for and against Cuadrilla’s applications involved different ways of  weighing the 
stated goals and other alleged positive consequences, on the one hand, against the alleged negative 
consequences, on the other. Both argument schemes, from goals and from consequences, were 
involved in each deliberative process: proposals made in view of goals (as positive consequences) were 
tested in light of negative consequences, with two outcomes: a conclusive rebuttal of the proposals 
(the outcome shown in Figure 1), and a claim that the proposals could be accepted in spite of a range 
of counterconsiderations (illustrated in Fairclough 2018b). In the context, however, the decision had 
to be taken on the basis of what was technically speaking at stake, i.e., one fracking pad in each 
location, for exploratory purposes, and for a limited duration. Thus, due to constraints imposed by the 
institutional context (obligations/prohibitions/authorizations), a decision with potentially huge 
implications was made to look as a much less significant one. Decision-makers were not allowed to 
consider the consequences of full-scale development (and were obliged to focus on the applications 
for exploration only). However, even if a proposal for full-scale development would have to be itself 
submitted for approval, and in theory could be rejected, independently of the success of the 
exploration phase, the exploratory phase would, nevertheless, if approved, as the proposal’s critics 
pointed out, authorize a change of land use (from agricultural to industrial) that would make a refusal 
much more difficult to support at a later stage.  
 
Argumentation from unacceptable consequences took various forms11. Arguments from risks and 
impacts were prominent in the corpus, with risk* occurring 133 times, and impact*  275 times. Related 
terms are: cause/causing (84, “cause birth defects/cancer/leukemia/heart disease”); effect* (61, 
“damaging/detrimental/cumulative effect”, “adverse health effects”), result* (40, “fracking will result 
in unavoidable environmental impacts”), consequence*(11, “unintended consequences”, “suffer the 
consequences”). Risks and impacts were related to health and wellbeing, water, air, farming and 
                                                   
10 Unless explicitly marked as [summary], all illustrations are direct quotes from the corpus, the LCC 
Constitution or other cited sources. 
 
11 In a fairly basic way, I have used corpus linguistics (CL) software (Antconc 2014) for wordlists, keywords, 
concordancing and collocations, to examine the range of reasons in favour or against the proposal. The Brown 
corpus  (Francis and Kučera 1964) was used as reference. As I have argued before (Fairclough 2016), while corpus 
linguistics methods can be extremely useful to the argumentation analyst, it is the structure of the argument 
(which schemes, which critical questions, which patterns?) that need to come first. CL methods cannot (in my 
view) be the main entry point into the analysis.  
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agriculture, tourism, earthquakes, flooding, environmental toxicity and radioactivity. The following 
frequencies of occurrence are significant for the main concerns of the participants to the debate: 
health/healthy (245); noise/noisy (228); traffic (130); water (126); safe/safety (125); 
pollution/polluting/pollutant (80); visual impact (75); children (70, i.e., exposing them to risks and 
impacts); air (61, e.g., air pollution); contamination/contaminated (46); agriculture/agricultural (54) 
and farming (16); flare/flaring (51, i.e., of methane gas into the atmosphere); fluid/fluids (35, e.g., flow-
back fluid, migrating fracking fluid); danger/dangerous (36); tourism/tourists (35); harm/harmful (31); 
wellbeing (27) and amenity (24); leaks/leakages (27) and spills/spillages (6);  vibration (25); methane 
(24); accidents (23); climate (23); toxic/toxicity (20); chemicals (16); radioactive/radioactivity (14); 
anxiety (15) and stress (15); ill/illness (13) and disease (6); respiratory (8), breathing (15), lung (6) and 
heart (5) conditions, including asthma (7); benzene (9), other carcinogens (5) and potential causes of 
cancer (10), including particulates (5) with no safe limits; fumes (9), odours (11) and smells (4); 
flood/flooding (8); earthquakes (7). Whether or not the regulatory regime in the UK was effective, 
seeing how responsibilities were dispersed among several agencies, was a prominent topic, with 140 
occurrences of regulatory/regulations/regulated. If regulation is indeed incapable of preventing 
breaches of the conditions imposed on the applicant, or of preventing accidents, then the arguments 
from unacceptable consequence can more easily refute the conclusion in favour of allowing fracking 
to proceed. For the proposal in favour to withstand critical questioning, the supporters would have to 
demonstrate that both the likelihood and magnitude of undesirable consequences is insignificant, 
which is precisely what an inefficient regulation system cannot guarantee. 12 
 
Impacts (275 occurrences) were uniformly judged to be unacceptable by the opponents, who argued 
that they could never be adequately mitigated; that the formal conditions placed on the applicant 
would not be complied with, that the council would be powerless to enforce them when breached, 
and so on.  By contrast, they were judged to be acceptable by the supporters, including the planning 
officer, in light of the alleged mitigation and control in place. Both unacceptable and acceptable occur 
64 times each, as in “unacceptable impacts”, “could be made acceptable”. The expression controlled 
by condition (i.e., noise impacts can be made acceptable by placing conditions on the applicant not to 
exceed a maximum decibel limit) occurs 18 times; its synonyms are: made acceptable by (the use of) 
conditions(s) (11), minimized by the use of condition (5), restricted by condition (1). Condition alone (in 
the sense of restrictions placed on the applicant) occurs 191 times. Mitigate/mitigation occurs 35 
times, for example in arguing that visual impacts can be made acceptable by making the applicant 
reduce the height of the rig from 53 to 36 metres, or that noise impacts can be made acceptable by 
building an acoustic barrier around the rig.  
 
Vocabulary pertaining to deliberation is also quantitatively significant, as expected. In addition to 
decision (140), consider (49), decide (24) and deliberate/deliberation (6), there are: reason/reasons 
(134, “reasons for refusal”, “reasons for approval”), support (149,  “supporting the proposal”), proposal 
(100), evidence (76, “no evidence of harm from the fracking industry”), grounds (66, “to refuse the 
application on air quality grounds would be unsustainable”), weigh/weight/outweigh (37, “carry 
weight”, “attach weight”, “place greater or lesser weight on”, “adverse impacts outweighing the 
benefits”) and override/overriding (5, “overriding need”, “overriding two local policies”), 
justify/justification (7, “justify your decision”, “there is sufficient justification to override these two 
policies”), “on balance” (6, “our officers are of the view therefore that, on balance, insufficient reasons 
… have been put forward”). The word (un)reasonable occurs 28 times (“unreasonable decision”, 
                                                   
12 Asterisks indicate various morphological forms of the same basic word (lemma): result* means result, 
results, resulting, resulted. Numbers in brackets indicate concordance hits (how many occurrences of a search 
term there are in the corpus) or (where indicated) keyness rank. 
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“incurring unreasonable burden”), with its contextual synonyms (un)sustainable (9, e.g., 
“unsustainable reasons for refusal”) and cannot be/should be supported (10, “reasons for refusal that 
cannot be supported”). Costs (37) and benefits (70) are measured against each other (“I’m sure that 
the benefits of the proposed site for Cuadrilla are huge, but for Lancashire I see that the benefits are 
minimal”), and certain ways of weighing them are considered unacceptable (“we’re not arguing for 
progress at any cost”, “not free enterprise at any cost to the local community”). Material (planning) 
consideration(s), as the only reasons that can be taken into account, occurs 21 times (e.g., “this is an 
understandable concern but not a material planning consideration”); in addition, there are planning 
grounds (5), planning reason(s) (4), planning terms (4), planning considerations (3), considerations that 
are not material (3) and planning matters (2). 
 
Most of the words above are keywords, by comparison with the reference corpus. Out of 872 keywords 
(selected out of 7240 word types), the following words are among the most unusually frequent (their 
rank, as keywords, is in brackets): noise (16), health (21), impact (24), environment (42), impacts (46), 
environmental (54), unacceptable (60), pollution (68), decision (73), sustainable (78), risks (80), 
acceptable (86), visual (92), landscape (101), risk (102), countryside (105), safety (113), jobs (115), 
tourism (123), wellbeing (152), contamination (155), mitigation (173), decibels (184), flaring (190), safe 
(191), seismic (195), unreasonable (206), toxic (225), agricultural (252), regulation (270), employment 
(285), harm (309), water (354), climate (401), farming (498). The expressions (un)acceptable, 
(un)reasonable, mitigate, (controlled by) condition, regulatory, which have important argumentative 
functions (indicating reasons why the proposals should be accepted or rejected, including deontic 
reasons), are also among the keywords, as expected. 
 
Argumentation from negative consequence can take various other forms, and these may not be easily 
captured by wordlists or keyword lists. A positive or negative view of the potential consequences can 
be expressed metaphorically or by analogy: “Pandora’s box” was used by an opponent, and Blackpool’s 
“golden ticket” by a supporter. The unacceptable “visual impact” was sometimes expressed without 
using these words at all, e.g.: “I for one would not wish to live in the middle of an enormous ugly 
birthday cake, with those annoying candles which do not blow out however many times one tries…”. 
The unacceptability of the proposal was also expressed via the analogy with “guinea pigs” in medical 
experiments (5 occurrences of “guinea pigs” and 4 of “experiment”) – a potentially very strong 
argument, seeing as the prohibition against treating people instrumentally (as “means”, rather than 
“ends” provides a non-overridable, decisive argument against any proposal). A wide range of rhetorical 
strategies were skillfully used by the speakers, from emotional appeals (e.g. the predicted impact on 
children) to literary allusion. One speaker’s overt reference to “England’s green and pleasant land” and 
other lines from the well-known British hymn based on the poem by William Blake can’t have failed to 
make other lines from the same hymn spring to mind, suggesting an analogy between Cuadrilla’s 
drilling pads and “the dark Satanic mills” of Blake’s poem. Argumentation by analogy thus strengthened 
the (un)acceptability of the proposals, by supporting the premises asserting that the consequences 
were either desirable or unacceptable, and thus fitting into the basic argumentative pattern in a 
relation of subordination to the two main schemes. 
 
To conclude, the case against and for fracking was eloquently made in various forms by those who took 
the floor during the four days of debate, in the form of an argument from negative (on balance, 
unacceptable) consequences, by contrast with an argument from goals and circumstances (typically, a 
problem-solution argument) made in favour. Other schemes were used to support the two conclusions, 
either directly or indirectly (by supporting the premises of these two main argument schemes): 
argumentation from analogy, example, expert opinion, appeals to majority practice, etc. Surprisingly, 
however, when the time for decision came, the case against fracking was reiterated in a severely 
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stunted form. The official conclusion (and decision) was to reject the PNR application on account of 
visual and noise impacts, and the Roseacre application on account of traffic impacts. No other reasons 
against fracking (i.e., risks to public health via air, soil and water contamination) made it into the final 
form of the two decisions. Most of the significant impacts and all risks were said to have been 
minimized and controlled in acceptable ways by conditions and regulations either already in place or 
to be imposed on the applicant. All that was within the councillors’ powers was to refuse the 
applications for one temporary fracking pad in each location, based on a small range of impacts that, 
arguably, could not be acceptably mitigated. It was not possible to the reject the applications by 
reference to the unacceptable effects of the subsequent commercial exploitation stage, nor on the 
basis of the unacceptable risks to public health and the environment involved in the exploration stage, 
as all such risks were allegedly minimized to an acceptable level by the UK ‘gold-standard’ regulation 
system (according to various expert organizations).   
 
The institutional context imposed therefore a number of limitations on the design of the deliberative 
procedure and consequently on the final decision outcome. On the one hand, the decision had to make 
reference to a limited set of relevant “material considerations” and a limited time-frame. This 
narrowed down the possibilities for challenging a potential decision in favour of shale exploration, as 
some grounds for refusal were ruled out. On the other hand, the institutional set-up  took for granted, 
without questioning, the power of regulatory systems to manage all future risks. This made a potential 
decision against fracking difficult to challenge, seeing as all possible objections based on risks were 
effectively neutralized. Nevertheless, a majority of councillors decided to reject the PNR application, 
against the officer’s recommendation and general government policy and behind-the-scene pressure. 
However, not being based on a wide range of significant unacceptable risks but on a small range of 
(arguably minor) impacts, this decision was going to prove easy to contest and reverse on appeal. 
 
5. Rights, obligations and prohibitions as reasons in the fracking debate 
Deontic powers provide agents with premises in practical reasoning, enabling and/or restricting what 
agents can do, argumentatively and practically speaking. Having the obligation or the right to take 
certain reasons into account, or being prohibited from doing so, will change the shape of the conclusion 
and/or corresponding decision. The list of “material considerations” for planning decisions provides a 
good example of the way the decision-making process was constrained or enabled by the existence of 
the obligation to take certain reasons into account, the prohibition against using reasons which are not 
“material” to the case, but also the right to weigh them in any way the decision-makers see reasonably 
fit. Deontic reasons (obligations, rights, prohibitions) arise from the councillors’ deontic powers, 
conferred to them by Parliament, inscribed in the LCC Constitution and their own job contracts as part 
of that institution. The source of all institutional constraints and affordances, whether procedural or 
substantive, as positive or negative deontic powers, lies in speech acts of declaration (Searle 2010). 
Like all speech acts of declaration, the LCC Constitution regulates power relations, in this case decision-
making powers at county level. 
 
The institutional goal of a county council debate is rational decision-making on matters of local policy. 
All communicative activity types are designed in a way that enables the achievement of an institutional 
goal, and this goal-orientation creates a generic conventional format which imposes certain “extrinsic 
constraints” on what participants can do, argumentatively speaking (van Eemeren 2010: 159-160). For 
example, on any controversial matter submitted for decision to the LCC, public participation is allowed, 
in order to allow the expression of a wide range of views (more than 100 members of the public took 
the floor this time), but each contribution is necessarily limited to a few minutes – in this case, 4 
minutes was the maximum allowed for each speaker. Also part of the institutional context was the fact 
that the application was assigned to a particular committee (DCC), tasked with regulating the 
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development and use of land in the public interest, including planning permission for waste disposal 
and mineral extraction, and was judged against that committee’s specific list of “material 
considerations”. Thus, a range of objections against fracking could not be taken into account, not being 
relevant as “planning issues”.  
 
According to the LCC website13, the following “material considerations” have to be considered in 
determining planning applications for oil and gas development (Figure 2): noise, dust, air quality, 
lighting, visual intrusion, landscape character, traffic, soil resources, contamination of land, impact on 
agricultural land, flooding, land stability, etc. Although frequent references were made during the 
debates on Cuadrilla’s application to the impact of fracking on climate change, human rights, the price 
of properties in the area, insurance and compensation, these (as was pointed out) were not material 
planning issues. Another reason that was “not material” was the prospect of the “costs which the 
council could be liable for if a challenge at appeal by the applicant was successful”. Councillors were 
reminded that fear of being thus penalized should not influence their decision, costs (15) not being a 
“material consideration” (“the committee should not be subjected to the non-material consideration 
of potential costs to the council as a basis of their decision-making process”).  
 
 
 
 
   Figure 2: Material considerations for planning applications, LCC website 
 
Many of the reasons that were thrown into the deliberative mix were institutional. The opponents 
argued that the proposal was in breach of the Local Development Plan, as a normative document 
(hence the LCC’s obligations to abide by its provisions), and in breach of the rights of citizens as human 
rights (24 relevant occurrences of “right(s)”, including “human rights”, but also the applicant’s 
“development rights”). Invoking the inviolable character of people’s basic rights (rights to life and a 
                                                   
13 The Lancashire County Council’s Constitution was  last updated in January 2018. Some of the formulations 
quoted in this paper may not be an exact match to the current website information. 
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safe environment, to ownership and enjoyment of one’s home, to freedom of expression and 
assembly, to participation in democratic government) was intended as a rebuttal of the case for 
fracking. Both the “guinea pig” analogy and the argument from inviolable human rights were put 
forward as clear decisive objections against the pro-fracking standpoint. However, in the institutional 
context in which the case was evaluated, both were ignored. As the DCC’s list of “material 
considerations” indicates, an explicit consideration of “human rights” seems to fall outside its 
institutional remit. If these arguments were at all acknowledged, they were answered (irrelevantly) by 
assurances that the risks and impacts would be successfully mitigated and no unacceptable 
consequences on the population would ensue. 
 
The supporters of fracking  argued that the proposal accorded with “national policy and guidance”, in 
light of which the local plan’s provisions (as obligations) were overridable, seeing as satisfactory impact 
mitigation and risk control were in place. Reasons judged to be material to the application create 
obligations to take them into account, they enable or authorize arguers to make use of them; reasons 
which are not create corresponding prohibitions. An argument which, according to the Officer, the 
opponents were not entitled to use to direct the decision outcome in their favour had to do with the 
potential for future commercial development of the sites, if the exploratory applications were to be 
approved. The opponents argued that approving the exploration phase would establish the “principle 
of development” (12) and authorize a “change of land use” (3) (from agricultural to industrial), making 
subsequent applications harder to refuse. They also urged councillors to consider that there was wide 
expressed opposition and little expressed support, and that they had a “duty” (14) to represent the will 
of their electorate; the councillors themselves spoke about their “duty” towards the people of 
Lancashire – “we owe them a duty to make the right decision”. In response, however, the Council 
Officer reminded councillors repeatedly of a few basic rules, inscribed in the Constitution and other 
LCC regulations, amounting to the following obligations and prohibitions: 
 
(1) Any proposal must be judged “on its merits”, i.e., not in light of what it could lead to in the future, 
not on the basis of “what it could become”; the proposal being for “exploration”, not commercial 
exploitation, cannot be rejected on the basis of the unacceptable consequences that full-scale future 
fracking activity might bring; future commercial exploitation, if viable, will be the subject of another 
application, to be assessed separately when the time comes. The following quotations are from the 
LCC Officer’s presentation: 
 
Concern has been expressed that each of these sites would subsequently be targeted for drilling 
in the future and that by granting planning permission now would establish the principle. This is 
not a view I share. The application must be considered on its merits, and as part of such there 
are no proposals to develop them in the future, and if there were, further planning permission 
would be required. 
 
[W]e must consider this application on its merits and not on what it may become, and we can’t 
attach weight to those comments that were made about what they would become in the long-
term. 
 
(2) In addition to being judged solely on their merits, all applications must be judged against the 
background of existing legislation, namely (also according to the LCC Officer): 
 
We must consider the applications on their merits against the national guidelines, national policy 
and policies of the local development plan. 
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(3) It is irrelevant how many people oppose a proposal if the proposal can be reasonably defended. In 
this case, although for the Preston New Road application alone 18,126 representations (letters, emails) 
objecting to the proposal had been received, as opposed to 217 in favour (for the Roseacre Woods 
application the numbers were 15,664 and 205, respectively), “the weight of opposition in terms of the 
numbers and representations received is not a material reason for refusing a planning application”, 
seeing as, according to the LCC Officer, the case for supporting the proposal had been made in a 
satisfactory way.  
 
(4) Similarly, the proposal cannot be rejected on account of unacceptable impacts, according to the 
Officer, seeing as the development is classed as temporary and its impacts reversible. Different rules 
apply for temporary vs permanent developments, and it is not reasonable to argue that a temporary 
development is unacceptable if impact mitigation and risk management are in place. 
 
Some of the constraints on the argumentation that was allowed were contested by the participants 
(members of the public and councillors themselves). They objected to the alleged “temporary” nature 
of the development as a mitigating factor (80 occurrences of “temporary”) and to the requirement of 
assessing the application in isolation, “on its merits” (12). It was pointed out that each application, if 
approved, will set a “precedent” (4), and is actually a “forerunner” (1), and “in preparation” of (1), “full-
scale commercial extraction”, which is what is allegedly at stake. 
 
You must know by now that there is a huge industrialized monster waiting in the wings to stamp 
its dirty footprint all over our county. And this application is laying down the foundations for this 
to go ahead and should be judged as such. It is preparation for full-scale commercial extraction. 
Mr. Perigo [The LCC Officer] stated that if commercial gas were found another application would 
be submitted. This is their plan. 
 
The applicant’s modus operandi is piecemeal…, and we are directed to view the applications as 
they stand in isolation and on their own merits. This is misleading and inappropriate for a new 
shale gas industry. The applications in front of us this week are setting a precedent and should 
be managed as such. (…) Authorising a change of land use will cause a precedent. This will make 
it very difficult to refuse further applications for development. 
 
There were also objections to the officer’s noticeable attempt to downplay the quantity of public 
opposition. He had suggested that, in spite of the “unprecedented number of representations that had 
been received”, many letters were duplicates, from the same individuals, or in other ways irrelevant, 
and they represented a very small percentage of the adult population of Lancashire. In response to the 
Officer’s insistence that what counts is the strength of the case being made, not the number of people 
making it, which is in principle a reasonable rule, the anti-fracking side brought concrete evidence to 
show that their case not only enjoyed the widest possible support but was also the better case. 
 
According to the LCC website, “the county council exists to serve everyone who lives or works in 
Lancashire, helping people to be healthy, happy and enjoy a good quality of life”; its Constitution 
ensures that “decision-making is efficient, transparent and accountable to local people”. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the duty of democratic representation was strongly emphasized in the fracking 
debate, for example: represent/representing/representative (29, “as a parish councillor, it is my duty 
to represent the opinions of my parishioners”, “this current government does not represent us”, 
“people are in tears because (…) they feel that you, their representatives, are being deliberately 
misled”), democracy/democratic (10, “a democratic decision”, “a democratic right to object to shale 
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gas”), elected (10, “as elected representative of the people of Lancashire”, “do what you were elected 
to do, which is representing the people of Lancashire”).  
 
6. Public health: material or non-material consideration? 
During the proceedings, councillors were reminded by the officer and the council’s lawyer that all 
decisions must be made “in accordance with the development plan unless material considerations 
indicate otherwise”, as specified in national planning practice guidance, and with “regard to the 
evidence presented” and to the “advice of the Council’s Officers”. Many speeches referred to the range 
of “material considerations”, as reasons that could potentially count against a proposal, and argued 
that it was too restricted: 
 
If I were a member of this committee, I would be seeking to separate the issues, in regard to 
just what is a material consideration and that which is not. …[A]s members of this committee 
you do not need reminding that when elected to LCC, you assumed certain responsibilities to 
the wider community regardless of their and your political allegiances. These responsibilities 
include matters which lie outside the strict material considerations. If representations from 
members of the public, officers and indeed members of the committee were confined to 
material considerations, we would have seen a significant curtailment of discussion. 
 
Many speakers emphasized that other considerations were highly relevant to the decision and should 
be allowed to carry weight in the planning balance, most importantly health risks (“health” is one of 
the main keywords, with 245 occurrences): 
 
Public health should be paramount in the considerations of the committee, not simply confined 
to the artificially narrow planning parameters suggested by your officer. 
 
You must refuse this application on health and environmental grounds, which you and the 
industry know cannot be mitigated, and not just on noise and landscape which, you will recall, 
caused the applicants to giggle and smirk when they asked for a deferral back in January. 
 
These objections show that, in the view of sections of the public, the legal institutional framework is 
not designed in a way that will facilitate rational decision-making, seeing as a range of relevant reasons 
have to be left out as “immaterial” to the case or are given insufficient weight in the planning balance. 
Insisting that councillors should take public health implications seriously into account and give them 
appropriate weight in deliberation, as an overriding duty, should be seen in the context of the expert 
reports received by the council, which had concluded that all risks and impacts would be successfully 
mitigated and controlled, hence within acceptable limits. These impact and risk assessments, originally 
produced for the applicant (and available on Cuadrilla’s website), were not challenged by either the 
LCC officer or the councillors during the debate. Impact and risk assessments with similar positive 
conclusions were produced by the Environment Agency, the Health and Safety Executive, Public Health 
England and other public organizations, whose experts gave evidence in the debate. “All [these 
agencies] have confirmed that with a properly regulated industry, the risks are minimal”, one supporter 
said.  
 
The following argument was used in various forms by the supporters of the applications:  
 
If properly regulated, fracking will be safe. 
Fracking will be properly regulated, 
Therefore, it will be safe. 
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This was supposed to persuade people to accept fracking applications, by accepting that the UK 
regulatory system is “robust” or “gold standard”, which will make the process safe. The validity of the 
argument did not, however, obscure the questionable truth value of the premises and conclusion for 
the audience. As one councillor put it (my italics):  
 
Significant bodies, Public Health England, The Royal Academy of Engineering, and The Royal 
Society say that fracking would be safe in the UK if properly regulated. This is a big if. 
 
Evidence was also cited of Cuadrilla’s record of “non-adherence to planning conditions elsewhere”, 
and of the “incapacity of various government bodies to regulate this industry”. In spite of this, the 
decision-making process seemed to proceed on the assumptions that fracking will be properly 
regulated (and conditions will be observed and enforced), and that proper regulation does guarantee 
safety. This (valid but arguably unsound) argument played a crucial role in neutralizing the most 
important objections to the proposals, based on risks to public health and on perceived violation of 
people’s basic right to living in a safe, healthy environment.  
 
7. Deontic reasons as premises in decision-making 
With the public health argument disposed of by appeals to “gold-standard” regulation, and no grounds 
to challenge the ability of regulating agencies to enforce future observance of rules, Councillors were 
left with a limited range of reasons they could use against fracking. These were not in the form of 
unacceptable risks, but in the form of unacceptable impacts. Among impacts, it was not the impacts 
on air quality or water resources that were used, as these too had been declared within acceptable 
limits by the experts. It was only noise and visual impacts that were demonstrably impossible to 
mitigate adequately and contrary to local policies regulating permitted developments in the 
countryside. On this rather slim basis, the motion to refuse the Preston New Road application was first 
put forward by Cllr Kevin Ellard, seconded by Cllr Chris Henig, and later summed up by Cllr Paul 
Hayhurst, who proposed 
 
…that the application be refused on the grounds that the development would cause an 
unacceptable adverse impact on the landscape arising from the drilling equipment, noise 
mitigation equipment, storage plant, [flare] stacks and other associated development. The 
combined effect would result in an adverse urbanizing effect on the open and rural nature of the 
landscape and visual amenity of local residents, contrary to policy DM2 of the Lancashire Waste 
and Minerals Plan, and Policy EP11 of the Fylde local plan… And that, secondly, the development 
would cause an unacceptable noise impact, resulting in a detrimental impact on the amenity of 
local residents, which could not be adequately controlled by condition, contrary to policies DM2 
of the Lancashire waste and minerals plan and policy EP27 of the Fylde local plan.  
 
The motion to reject the PNR application was put to the vote at the end of Wednesday 24 June 2015, 
and was defeated (7:8) on the casting vote of the Chair. However, in light of controversial and multiple 
legal advice received, another vote took place on Monday 29 June, instigated by Cllr Hayhurst, when 
the motion was approved (9:3, 2 abstentions) and thus Cuadrilla’s application for exploratory fracking 
at Preston New Road was rejected. In so doing, councillors made use of the “deontic powers” attached 
to their position (inscribed in the Constitution and also reconfirmed by the legal advice they took). The 
Constitution and the lawyers that had been consulted said that, while being obliged to take the officers’ 
recommendations into account, as well as the views of experts and all the available evidence, 
councillors (as elected politicians) have the right (or are entitled) to weigh the evidence differently and 
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come to a different conclusion from their officers. This fundamental right turned out to be crucially 
important in the decision-making process.  
 
As predicted, Cuadrilla appealed against this unfavourable decision, which was re-evaluated by an 
inspector, following a public inquiry held in Blackpool in February-March 2016. The appeal was 
“recovered” by Communities and Local Government Secretary Sajid Javid, who overturned LCC’s 
decision against Cuadrilla’s application on 6 October 2016. In appealing against the original decision, 
Cuadrilla’s lawyers argued that the LCC had “failed to apply national policy and carry out anything that 
approximated to a reasonable planning balance”. Seeing as “the strong national need for the 
development [of shale gas] was clearly stated in national policy at the date of refusal”, the LCC’s 
decision had been unreasonable, “in plain breach of national policy, and relied on two wholly 
unreasonable and unsustainable grounds in doing so...” (McKay 2016). 
The planning inspector acknowledged that some of the impacts causing “demonstrable harm” could 
not be eliminated, but argued that the impacts “would be reduced to an acceptable level”, the 
development would be in accordance with all local policies (the Local Development Plan and the Fylde 
Borough Local Plan) “taken as a whole” and “should therefore be permitted unless material 
considerations indicate otherwise”. Crucially, the development was supported by national policy: “the 
national need for shale gas exploration is a factor of great weight in support of this appeal”, while the 
local population’s concerns, being “satisfactorily controlled by planning conditions or by other 
regulatory regimes”, “can only be attributed little weight in the planning balance” (McKay 2016).  
Clearly, the Inspector and the DCC councillors weighed the arguments for and against Cuadrilla’s 
applications very differently. If, for the councillors, the “national need” argument had played no role 
in decision-making, the inspector seemed to find it overriding, in a situation where the impacts 
(arguments against), found non-overridable by the councillors, were deemed to be all within 
acceptable limits by the inspector. Both the inspector and the councillors, however, were within their 
legal rights (and entitled) to come to a different planning balance, provided they took all evidence into 
account and could justify their choices. In coming to different conclusions, both the councillors and the 
inspector were using the deontic powers assigned to them in virtue of their job contracts with their 
own institution (county council, planning inspectorate). In making the final decision, the minister was 
also using his own deontic powers, within a legal institutional framework. This framework was 
nevertheless vocally contested by local people who suggested the system was biased against local 
democracy and unduly favouring the applicant. It was, they said, unjust to remove decisions on matters 
with local impact from local decision-making powers, seeing as central government was geographically 
far away from the impacts and risks that local people would be subjected to. Doing so also contravened 
stated government policies – the devolution of power to local government. I will return to this 
discussion further below. 
 
8. Non-deontic power: government and corporate power 
A decision that is in keeping with the rules (i.e., in accordance with all the institutional constraints and 
affordances) is not necessarily a decision that can withstand critical questioning, if the rules themselves 
are unreasonable. Throughout the debate, members of the public challenged the institutional design, 
for example the obligation to consider the application in isolation, “on its merits”, and as a “temporary” 
proposed development. While both of the latter constraints are in principle reasonable, their effect 
was only to make Cuadrilla’s application harder to reject, by weakening the force of otherwise powerful 
arguments against it. They also argued that risks to public health should be given a more significant 
role in the planning balance, rather than being ignored in the light of assumptions about the efficiency 
of regulatory systems ungrounded in actual evidence. The combined effect of these institutional 
constraints was to downplay the potential impact of the application and make it more difficult to reject. 
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Searle’s theory of institutional reality offers a principled way of distinguishing between institutional 
constraints and affordances, such as the rights, obligations and entitlements at work in the decision-
making process discussed above, which are all manifestations of deontic power, and other 
manifestations of power which are not legitimate in the institutional context at issue. The source of all 
genuinely institutional constraints lies in the speech acts of declaration that constitute the institutions 
in question. What agents are institutionally obliged to do must be distinguished from what they feel 
(dis)inclined to do, or what is prudentially (un)advisable for them to do. It may be prudentially advisable 
for councillors to agree with the government, but their main institutional duty is to the local population.  
 
Many speeches during the debate referred to perceived government interference behind the scenes,   
the bias displayed by some of the pro-fracking expert reports, including the LCC officer’s report, and  
the active attempts (by the pro-fracking side and the government) to discredit, ignore or withhold 
inconvenient evidence (the “redacted DEFRA report”). A leaked letter  from Chancellor George 
Osborne to cabinet colleagues was cited during the debates as demonstrating collusion between the 
government and Cuadrilla, and a clear intention to have future decisions removed from local 
democratic institutions (Carrington 2015), in violation of existing institutional rules. There is no space 
to discuss these here in detail. One councillor spoke of the “restrictive force of government 
intervention”, of an unacceptable “degree of interference” from ministers “into the decision-making 
process of this local planning authority”, of a “bullying government” trying to turn the LCC’s decision 
into a “sham event”, a “pretence” of democracy. He asked councillors to do the “right” thing, do what 
they “were elected to do, which is representing the people of Lancashire’s best interests”, “not the 
narrow self-interests of a handful of industrialists”. 
 
Such speeches refer at once to deontic and non-deontic constraints: obligations arising from 
councillors’ institutional roles as elected politicians, on the one hand, and illegitimate government 
pressures, attempting to influence the outcome, on the other. The latter manifestation of power is 
non-deontic in the context of the LCC: the government had no right to intervene directly in a local 
planning matter. However strong the unofficial pressures coming from the government might be, they 
were not institutional constraints in the LCC decision-making context and were legitimately criticized 
and ignored. Councillors acknowledged a deontic reason (obligation) to arrive at a decision that 
embodied the interest of local communities, as elected representatives, and took advantage of their 
legal right to disagree with their officers (as an “affordance”). They did not acknowledge an institutional 
obligation to agree with the pressures coming from the government but described such central 
interventions (across institutional spheres or domains) as “illegitimate” and “illegal”14.  
 
While the government arguably had no legal right to interfere in the original decision, it was given this 
right on appeal. The appeal procedure (as a matter of institutional design) highlights the bias that is 
legally built into the procedure. If the outcome of deliberation at local democratic level is undesirable 
from the government’s point of view, the decision can be legally overturned, via a procedure so 
designed as to enable decision-makers at central level to assign different weights to the same evidence, 
to support a different conclusion. In this way, a government minister can have the final say over a 
fracking application, regardless of opposition at local level, and people who will not have to bear the 
negative consequences of their decisions will be given the right to decide for those who will. (Recent 
research in the UK has focused increasingly on fracking in relation to social and environmental justice, 
democracy and “social licence”  – see Bradshaw and Waite 2017, Cotton 2017, Whitton et al 2017.) 
                                                   
14 This in spite of the fact that, in principle, the Constitution allows councillors to decide against local interests 
in order “to accord with the legislation and Government Guidance”, if there are good reasons for doing so. 
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9. Conclusion 
I have suggested that understanding the impact of the institutional context on the reasonableness of 
argumentation, as well as the rationality of decision-making, requires Searle’s theory of institutions 
and his notion of deontic power. Taking the form of obligations, rights, entitlements, prohibitions, and 
the like, deontic reasons shape the conclusions and decisions that can be reached. Deontic reasons are 
in principle non-overridable, being part of collectively recognized (though not necessarily collectively 
accepted) institutional arrangements. The LCC debate took place within an institutional framework 
criticized by many as incapable of producing a maximally rational outcome, including a legal, yet overly 
narrow set of planning considerations, a way of neutralizing critical objections (including decisive ones) 
by appeals to systems of rules and regulations, an appeals procedure that seemed inherently biased 
against the standpoint of local people. The constraints and opportunities provided by a less-than-ideal 
institutional design were nevertheless skillfully exploited by county councillors, who (in June 2015) 
managed to make the best of an unfavourable argumentative situation, by using their legal rights to 
disagree with the recommendations of experts and officers, and to weigh the evidence in a way that 
refuted those recommendations.  The fact that their decision was legally overturned by central 
government on appeal (October 2016) points to in-built bias against local democracy at the level of 
institutional design. An institutional order grounded in the law collided with a political order grounded 
in representative democracy: the latter won the day in June 2015 but was subsequently defeated in 
October 2016 (when the original decisions were overturned). 
 
I have looked at a range of institutional “pre-conditions” to argumentation, both procedural and 
substantive. In any institutional context, in addition to manifestations of legitimate (i.e., deontic) 
power, there may be manifestations of other forms of power. In any argumentative context, people 
may find themselves under various kinds of pressures to decide in a particular way. They may have 
rights and obligations prescribed in virtue of their institutional roles, but they may also feel bound to 
adopt a line of conduct for prudential reasons, in relation to self-interest or in response to perceived 
danger or threat. These latter manifestations of power are not institutional, but may in practice be 
(illegitimately) used in the institutional context. Attempted government interference in the LCC’s 
decision was an example of an illegitimate use of power, and whatever pressure it exerted on the 
councillors ought to have been (and was) overridden by the rights and obligations that councillors had 
as part of their institutional roles. The final outcome of Cuadrilla’s appeal, however, illustrated the way 
in which local deontic powers can be legally (though arguably illegitimately, from a political point of 
view) overridden by the powers of central government, via an institutional procedure designed in such 
a way as to prioritize national and corporate interests over the rights of local populations. 
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